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Co2vAENTs
legislation, the law's most important effect will be to increase the
number of convictions and thus deter the public from driving after
drinking by increasing the fear in a potential drinking driver that he
may be convicted for the offense if apprehended. Another benefit of
these statutes is that, with the imprecision of subjective observation
replaced by objective evidence, the innocent individual is fully
protected and the impaired driver is justly adjudicated guilty.
On the other side is the opinion expressed by Judge Osborne that
coercion to obtain physical evidence violates the right against self-
incrimination. The rationale behind this privilege is that the words
of the accused could well be unreliable when obtained by compulsory
process. But the accuracy of physical evidence, in this case blood
alcohol content, is in no way affected by the compulsion involved.
Therefore, the need to remove the drinking driver from the state's
highways requires that the Kentucky Court of Appeals uphold the
constitutionality of Kentucky's implied consent statute against fifth
amendment challenges, as have the courts of other jurisdictions. 53
Taft A. McKinstry
CoNs rrrONAL LAw-THE PowER OF A GOVERNOR TO PROCLAIM Ma-
TL&. LAw AND USE STATE MLrTARY FORCES TO SUPPRESS CANTUS
DEMONSrRATION.-On April 30, 1970 the war in Indochina came home.
It exploded on a thousand' college and university campuses as the
shock waves of outrage swept the country following the President's
announcement of the invasion of Cambodia by the Armed Forces of
the United States.2 While the President attempted to head off the
constitutional crisis he had created by his unilateral action,3 Americans,
53 See note 9 supra, and accompanying text.
1 The magnitude of the reaction is not exaggerated. NEwswEEK, May 18,
1970, at 28.
2 On April 30, 1970, the President in a nationally televised speech, an-
nounced that 20 000 American troops had joined South Vietnamese forces in an
invasion of Cambodia. The stated purpose of the invasion was the destruction of
enemy sanctuaries in that country. N wswYP- May 11, 1970, at 22-28. NEws-
wEEE, May 25, 1970, at 29. The invasion was such an unexpected shock to the
American people because just ten days before in another televised speech, the
President had announced that he would withdraw an additional 150,000 troops
from South Vietnam over the following twelve months. NEWswEEK, May 4, 1970,
at 21-22. Only two days before the announced invasion. Secretary of State William
Rogers reassured the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the United States
would not engage in ground military operations in Cambodia. NEwswEr, May 11,
1970, at 23.
3 The President had not consulted Congress before he ordered the invasion
of Cambodia by American military forces. He had not even informed members
(Continued on next page)
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especially students, their confidence in the nation's leaders decimated,
their trust seemingly betrayed by the escalation of a war that they
had been told repeatedly was shrinking, rose up in despair and anger
against the Chief Executive.4 Four days later, National Guard troops,
called out by the Governor of Ohio to suppress student demonstra-
tions at Kent State University, shot four students to death5 in a totally
unjustified and unnecessary over-reaction.0 The response nationwide
was swift and violent as an already divided country plunged into
near civil war. Open warfare raged on over twenty campuses.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
of the legislative branch of his plans. NEwswF, May 18, 1970, at 35. Such
behavior made a constitutional crisis inevitable. Senator Vance Hartke voiced the
sentiments of many senators when he said: "The President's action in sending
U.S. troops into Cambodia amounts to a declaration of war against the Senate."
NEwsw=, May 11, 1970, at 25. Senator Stephen Young introduced a resolution
to censure the President for his "unconstitutional involvement of the United
States in an undeclared war ...... NvswEEK, May 11, 1970, at 25. For an over-
view of Congressional reaction see NEwswEEx May 11, 1970, at 22-26; NEWsWEEF,
May 18, 1970, at 26, 35-36; NEwswEK, May 25, 1970, at 29-31.
4 For an overview of the reaction of the country in general and the college
and university campuses in particular, see NEwswEEK,, May 11, 1970, at 22-26,
32-33; NEwswEErK, May 18, 1970, at 26-30.
5 On May 2, 1970, during a demonstration against the Cambodian invasion,
the R.O.T.C. building on the campus was destroyed by fire. Following the
destruction of the building, the mayor of Kent, Ohio requested that the Governor
call in the National Guard. The Governor did so without hesitation. He ordered
an armored regiment and an infantry battalion to the campus and declared martial
law. The Governor then went to Kent, Ohio himself, made an inflammatory speech,
all but took personal command of the troops, and, without consulting with
National Guard or university officials, ordered all assemblies-even peaceful ones-
broken up. It is perhaps significant that the Governor was in the final stages of a
difficult senate primary race in which he had made campus disorders a major
issue. The election was only a few days away at the time. On May 4, 1970, a
rally formed. A battle ensued with the Guardsmen using tear gas and the students
allegedly throwing rocks and chanting epithets. After approximately twenty-five
minutes of the demonstration, and with no warning, some troops fired directly into
the crowd of students, killing four and wounding nine. Ignoring cries for help,
the troops marched away. NEwsWEEK, May 18, 1970, at 31-32.
6 The Ohio National Guard claimed that a mob of students had encircled
them and were showering the troops with rocks and chunks of concrete. The
Guard also claimed that they had run out of tear gas, that there was a sniper, and
that the troops had fired only to save their lives. A Justice Department summary
of the F.B.I. investigation involving one hundred agents and culminating in a
7,500 page report found that: 1) the shootings were "not necessary and not in
order; 2) no guardsman was in danger of losing his life at the time of the
shootings; 3) the guardsmen had not run out of tear gas; 4) the demonstrators
could have been turned back by arrests and tear gas; 5) there was no siper;
6) the guardsmen were not surrounded; 7) only one guardsman was hurt by
rocks seriously enough to require any type of medical 
aid; 8) some guardsmen
had to be physically restrained from continuing to fire their weapons into the
crowd of students; 9), there is some reason to believe that the National Guard's
claim that Guardsmen's lives were in danger was fabricated after the event; 10)
a minimum of 54 shots were fired by a minimum of 29 of the 78 guardsmen at
the scene in the space of 11 seconds; and 11) thirteen students were hit-all but
four in the back and side. See NxwswE=., Aug. 3, 1970, at 14; N.Y. Times, July
24, 1970, at 1, col. 4; Louisville Courier-Journal, Oct. 31, 1970, at 1, col. 4.
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More than two hundred colleges and universities were shut down in
protest over the invasion and the Kent killings. Seventy-five thousand
persons converged on Washington, D.C., to convey to the nation the
rage of the martyred American anti-war movement.7
During the turbulent days following the Cambodian invasion, six
state governors proclaimed martial law and used National Guard
troops to suppress campus demonstrations." Among the campuses
placed under martial law was the University of Kentucky. What made
the Kentucky situation virtually unique, however, was that while
students and faculty confronted National Guardsmen armed with live
ammunition and mounted bayonets, the Governor's power to proclaim
martial law and use those troops was being challenged in federal
district court.
On the evening of May 5, 1970, students at the University of Ken-
tucky conducted a march 9 to protest the invasion of Cambodia'0 and
the killing of the four students at Kent State the day before." Pre-
vented from marching into the downtown area by police, the students
gathered in front of the Army R.O.T.C. building on the campus.
Approximately one hundred riot-equipped police moved into the area
to protect the building. While the student demonstrators confronted
the police, the Air Force R.O.T.C. building in another part of the
University was destroyed by fire. 12
On May 6, 1970, the President of the University declared that a
limited emergency existed on the campus and imposed a 5:00 p.m.
curfew on all gatherings of any kind-peaceful or otherwise. The
order was challenged by a group of students who conducted a peace-
7 NEwswEL7, May 18, 1970, at 28.8 Illinois, Maryland, New Mexico, Wisconsin, Ohio, and Kentucky. Id.
9Actually, the first manifestation of the rising level of student tension
occurred earlier in the day when approximately 250 students attempted to attend
an open meeting of the Board of Trustees in order to urge the Board to condemn
the invasion and the killings in Ohio. Only 35 students were admitted, and the
rest were barred from the meeting due to inadequate accommodations in the
room in which the Board had chosen to meet. The students, packed into a small
area outside the meeting room, began to chant and yell that the meeting should
be moved to a larger area. Tensions rose and finally erupted in a brief club-
swinging skirmish involving campus police, students, and a member of the Board.
Following the end of the meeting, the demonstration broke up peacefully. See
Lexington Herald, May 6, 1970, at 1, col. 5; Lexington Leader, May 6, 1970, at 1,
col. -; Louisville Courier-Journal, May 7, 1970, at 1, col. 1.
30 See note 2 supra.
11 See note 5 supra.
12 See Lexington Herald, May 6, 1970, at 1, col. 5; Lexington Leader, May 6,
1970, at 1, col. -; Lexington Herald, May 7, 1970, at 1, col. 1.
The President of the University later testified that there was no evidence that
the Air Force R.O.T.C. building fire was connected with the student demonstra-
tions. Louisville Courier-Journa, May 12, 1970, at 1, col. 2.
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ful demonstration that lasted past the curfew deadline. The Governor
then issued an executive order"8 proclaiming martial law, imposing a
7:00 p.m. to 6:30 a.m. curfew on the campus, and sending State Police 4
and two hundred fifty armed National Guardsmen 5 to join the
existing contingent of campus, city, and state police.1 The Governor
justified his action by declaring that a clear and present danger to
life and property existed on the campus.' 7 The decision was solely
the Governor's. The President of the University had not requested
the troops.' At 7:00 p.m. the students were forcefully driven from
13 The text of the order was:
This is an emergency message and executive order of the Governor of
the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
I have determined that a state of emergency exists on the campus
of the University of Kentucky.
There exists a clear and present danger to the life of students and
to University property.
Therefore, as Governor of the Commonwealth of Kentucky and as
chairman of the Board of Trustees, I am directing that a curfew be im-
posed upon the U.K. campus from 7 p.m. tonight, Wednesday, May 6,
until 6:30 a.m., Thursday, May 7, and requesting all students to remain
in their rooms and all people to stay off and away from the campus
during these hours.
The Kentucky State Police and an adequate number of National
Guardsmen with mounted bayonets and live ammunition are being
moved onto the campus to protect the students and University property.
These officers are under order to use such force as is necessary to
perform their mission of protection.
Anyone attempting to defy them does so at his own peril.
Please comply for your own safety and the safety of all others.
See Lexington Leader, May 6, 1970, at 1, col. -; Lexington Herald,
May 7, 1970, at 1, col. 6.
14 Ky. REv. STAT. [hereinafter cited as KRS] § 16.120 (1950) provides with
regard to the State Police:
Neither the commissioner nor any officer of the department shall exercise
the powers conferred by KRS 16.010 to 16.180 within the limits of any
incorporated city of the first to the fifth class, inclusive, except... when
requested to act by the chief executive officer of the city or its chief
police officer, or... when ordered by the Governor, in case of emergency,
to act within any specified city or cities....
15 See note 27 infra.
16The initial contingent of city and state police had been sent to the Univer-
sity of Kentucky campus pursuant to the request of the University's Director of
Safety and Security when, in his opinion, the campus police could no longer handle
the situation in front of the Army R.O.T.C. building on the evening of May 5,
1970, the night of the fire. See Lexington Leader, May 6, 1970, at 16, col. 7.
See note 14 supra.
17The Governor was allegedly concerned about possible arson, bomb threats,
rumors of outside agitators, and disruption of the academic process. See Lexington
Herald, May 7, 1970, at 1, col. 1; Lexington Leader, May 7, 1970, at 1, col. -;
Louisville Courier-Journal, May 7, 1970, at 15, col. 1.
In his opening statement at the hearing for a preliminary injunction to
remove the troops from the University of Kentucky campus, the Attorney General,
counsel for the Governor, asserted that "proof will show that the Governor . . .
reacted to a clear and present danger." Lexington Herald, May 12, 1970, at 12,
col. 4. See note 13 supra.
18At the hearing for the preliminary injunction to remove the National Guard
from the University of Kentucky campus, the President of the University testified
(Continued on next page)
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the campus as martial law and military control of the University
grounds began.19
On May 7, 1970, the ban on assembly was extended to cover
daytime gatherings as well, thus completely suspending the rights of
free speech and assembly. A peaceful noon rally was broken up by
State Police and National Guardsmen, and several arrests were made.
A subsequent orderly and unobstructive gathering was dispersed
without warning by National Guardsmen using tear gas. 20 The curfew
was ordered extended to include the night of May 7, 1970. That after-
noon, suit was filed in United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Kentucky seeking, among other relief, a declaration that
the Governor's order proclaiming martial law and calling in the state
military forces was unconstitutional, and an injunction ordering the
removal of all non-university forces from the campus as well as an
end to martial law. A motion for a temporary restraining order was
denied,21 but a hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction
was granted. At the close of the plaintiffs' case, the defendants moved
to dismiss the complaint. Held: Sustained. There was a clear and
present danger to life and property, and in such situations the
Governor has authority in law to proclaim martial law and use state
military forces to restore order. American Association of University
Professors v. Nunn, Civil No. 2139 (E.D. Ky., May 14, 1970).
The oral opinion of the Court justified the Governor's actions
solely on the basis of the clear and present danger test, thus ignoring
plaintiffs' contention that the proper test (of the legality of a proclama-
tion of martial law and use of the National Guard to control demon-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
that he had not requested that National Guardsmen be sent to the campus to
suppress the demonstrations. The President testified that the decision was made
solely by the Governor after he was told "a number of students and some faculty
members" would not obey the President's 5:00 p.m. curfew on assemblies.
Louisville Courier-Journal, May 12, 1970, at 1, col. 1.
19 Following their expulsion from the campus, the students marched across
the city to the campus of Transylvania University and held an orderly rally
consisting of speeches and songs. Twenty state police officers and twenty-four
armed National Guardsmen converged on the scene. Transylvania University
officials told the police and guardsmen to leave the campus grounds since the
group of students was orderly. After some argument, the police and guardsmen
left the area. The Transylvania University officials had not requested either the
troops or the police to come to the campus. Lexington Herald, May 7, 1970, at
1, col. 5.
20 For descriptions of these events, see Louisville Times, May 7, 1970, at 1,
col. 1; Lexington Herald, May 8, 1970, at 1, col. 4.
21 The Court denied the motion for a temporary restraining order because
"the only facts before this Court consist of the subject Complaint with its attach-
ments, and several clippings from the news media, as well as oral allegations of
plaintiffs counser' and because "neither the defendants nor any counsel for them
has bad an opportunity to come before the Court and be heard on this matter."
Order, Civil No. 2139 (E.D. Ky., May 8, 1970).
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strations) is the inability of local authorities to control the situation
and the virtual disintegration of local government.
This comment offers two points of analysis. First, an examination
of the relevant case law shows the clear and present danger test
applied by the Court in AAUP v. Nunn to be an erroneous one inap-
plicable to a martial law situation. When taken in the overview, the
cases suggest a more complex doctrine, adherence to which is essential
if a Governor's actions are to be consistent with due process of law.
Second, this comment urges that the courts adopt a new doctrine hold-
ing that National Guard troops are so inherently incapable of dealing
with demonstrations on college and university campuses in accordance
with due process that the Constitution prohibits their use in any
capacity in such situations.
I.
The constitution of the Commonwealth of Kentucky does not
explicitly authorize the Governor to proclaim martial law and call up
the National Guard to suppress disorders and enforce the laws of the
Commonwealth on university campuses or anywhere else.22 However,
the constitution does confer upon the Governor the supreme executive
power.23 It also designates him as the commander-in-chief of the
Commonwealth's army and navy.24 Furthermore, the Governor is
charged by the Kentucky constitution with the faithful execution of
the laws.2 5 From these delegations of power, the Governor's power
to proclaim martial law and use the military forces of the Common-
wealth to suppress disorders is implied, and these specifically granted
powers serve as the constitutional base for statutes authorizing the
Governor to call out and direct the National Guard.26 Thus, the
Governor's power in this area is statutory in origin and construction.
These statutes authorize Kentucky's chief executive to activate the
state's military forces and use them to suppress any actual or threat-
22 Thirty-five state constitutions do explicitly grant such power to their respec-
tive governors. The constitutions of fifteen states, including Kentucky, do not.
Of those fifteen states, one, Tennessee, specifically denies such power to the gover-
nor. Note, Constitutional and Statutory Bases of Governor' Emergency Powers, 64
MIcH. L. REv. 290, 292-93 & nn.7 & 10 (1965).
23The supreme executive power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in
a Chief Magistrate, who shall be styled the 'Governor of the Common-
wealth of Kentucky.' Ky. CONST. § 69.
24 He shall be Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy of this Com-
monwealth, and of the militia thereof, except when they shall be called
into the service of the United States; but he shall not command personally
in the field, unless advised to do so by a resolution of the General As-
sembly. Ky. Cos. § 75.
25 "He shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed." Ky. CONST. § 81.
26 See 64 Mxcr. L. R v., supra note 22, at 292.
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ened invasion, rebellion, insurrection, riot, or violence. The Governor
is also empowered by statute to prescribe the duty to be performed
by the troops as well as to delegate this authority to certain civil
authorities in the Commonwealth. However, the tactical decisions and
direction of the military forces are solely the province of the military
commanders.2 7
In addition to impliedly granting to the Governor the power to
proclaim martial law and direct the state military forces pursuant to
such proclamation, the Kentucky constitution also restricts the Gover-
nor's exercise of these powers. Section 15 provides that only the
General Assembly can suspend the laws of the Commonwealth. 28
Governors of several states in this century have shown a remarkable
propensity for suspending the civil law, through the tool of a procla-
mation of martial law, in order to enforce or carry out illegal executive
whims.29 The Kentucky constitution would seem to prohibit such
practices on the part of the Governor as well as the use by him of an
emergency situation to justify a wholesale and arbitrary suspension of
constitutional and statutory rights. The restriction, however, would
not appear to prohibit gubernatorial actions under martial law that
supplemented the laws without suspending them.
Section 22 of the Kentucky constitution provides that the military
power of the Commonwealth is at all times to be absolutely subordi-
27 KBS § 37.240 (1942) provides:
The Governor is hereby authorized to call and assign any part of the
Kentucky Active Militia to active service for the purpose of resisting
invasion, suppressing rebellions, insurrections, riots or threats thereof; to
suppress any active, inlawful or threatened violence to persons or property
this State; to authorize the arrest of all persons engaged in aiding or
abetting therein; to investigate any acts of treason, sabotage or attempted
sabotage and to cause the arrest of such persons engaged therein for aiding
and abetting; to protect life and property in the event of any emergency or
disaster. The Governor may by his order prescribe the duty to be per-
formed by the troops thus called into active field service. The Governor
may direct the commanding officer of such military forces thus ordered
into service to report to any of the following named civil officers of the
district, county city or town: Circuit judge, sheriff, county judge or
mayor- and such civil officers may direct the specific object to be accom-
plished by such military force, but the tactica direction and disposition
of the troops and the particular means to be employed to accomplish
the object shall be left solely to the officers of the Kentucky Active
Militia. Troops shall not be relieved from active field service except by
order of the Governor.
KRS § 38.030 (1962) provides essentially the same thing as KRS § 37.240 (1942)
with insignificant alterations in wording.
28"No power to suspend laws shall be exercised, unless by the general as-
sembly or its authority." Ky. CONST. § 15.
Only nineteen state constitutions include this restriction on the governor's
power: Ala., Ark., Del., Hawaii, Ind., Ky., Me., Md., Mass., N.H., N.C., Ohio,
Ore., Pa., S.C., S.D., Tex., Vt., and Va.; 64 MxcH. L. Rzv., supra note 22, at 293
& n.16.
29 See notes 63-72 infra.
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nate to the civil power.3 0 The Kentucky Court of Appeals has held
that this provision demands that members of the state militia be
subject at all times to the civil law and can thus utilize no means to
control disorders that are not also legally available to the civil
authorities. 31 However, the subsequent statutory grants of authority32
seem to bestow discretionary powers beyond these limits of the con-
stitution. Statutes are incapable of nullifying a judicial construction
of the constitution; and, unless the Court of Appeals is inclined toward
the total obliteration of sixty years of settled law, 33 these particular
statutes are constitutionally vulnerable at best.3 4 After an examination
of the constitutional and statutory authority defining the Kentucky
Governor's emergency military powers, the questions remain. When
is the Governor authorized to proclaim martial law and use military
forces to suppress campus demonstrations? Must more than the
statutory "active, unlawful or threatened violence"3 5 exist, or is this
sufficient per se to unleash martial law and the stifling rule of
"National Guardsmen with mounted bayonets and live ammunition?"3 0
3 0 No standing army shall, in time of peace, be maintained without the
consent of the general assembly; and the military shall, in all cases and
at all times, be in strict subordination to the civil power; nor shall any
soldier, in time of peace, be quartered in any house without the consent
of the owner nor in time of war, except in a manner prescribed by law.
ICY. CONST. 1 22.
All state constitutions except that of New York have similar provisions. 64
MICH. L. Bxv., supra note 22, at 294 & n.19.
31'The military shall be at all times and in all cases in strict subordination
to the civil power. . . .' We have not, and cannot have, in this state a
military force that is not and will not be subordinate to the civil authori-
ties.... Franks v. Smith, 142 Ky. 232, 242, 134 S.W. 484, 488 (1911).
[T]o say that the state militia... may commit any act... necessary
to restore peace and quiet, although such act might be a greater violation
of law than was committed by the person it was visited upon, would place
the militia above the civil authorities, and give to the soldier power not
conferred upon the civil officer charged with the duty of enforcing the
law. ... We can find no warrant, either in the Constitution or statute
of the state or the history of constitutional government, for investing the
military forces of the state with arbitrary power like this.... Id. at 245,
134 S.W. at 490.
In respect to these orders, the powers of the military and local civil
officers of the state are identical. What one cannot do, neither can the
other; what one may do, so may the other. The soldier has the same
measure of protection and is subject to the same liability, whether he is
acting under the orders of a military officer, independent of the local
civil authorities, or is acting under immediate direction of these authori-
ties. Neither has the right to give any orders or directions except those
that a peace officer of the state might rightfully execute .... Id. at 251,
134 S.W. at 492.
32 See note 27 supra.
z3 See note 31 supra.34 But see 64 MIcH. L. REv., supra note 22, at 295-96 & nn.22-27.
35 See note 27 supra.36 See note 13 supra.
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What criteria are to be applied in order to avert the danger of execu-
tive government becoming "dictatorial and tyrannical" through "the
threatened use of troops and the threat of military dictatorship
'
"
37
Can the use of National Guard troops, in any capacity, to suppress
campus demonstrations be consistent with due process? The solution
to these problems requires an initial analysis of history beginning
with the most elementary of basics-definitions.
Exactly what martial law is has not been clearly established by the
courts or the commentators.38 However, one definition exists which
appears to combine the major qualities most often attributed to
martial law:
Martial law, also termed martial rule, is the exercise of the
military power which resides in the Executive Branch of the Gov-
ernment to preserve order, and insure the public safety in do-
mestic territory in time of emergency, when civil governmental
agencies are unable to function or their functioning would itself
threaten the public safety. Martial law depends for its jurisdiction
upon public necessity. Necessity gives rise to its creation, necessity
justifies its exercise, and necessity limits its duration. The extent
of the military force used and the actual measures taken, con-
sequently, will depend upon the actual threat to order and public
safety which exists at the time.3 9 (emphasis added)
The requirement of a real necessity incapable of being controlled
by local authorities is critical, as this analysis will show.
When the United States is engaged in a declared war, fighting for
its survival as a viable nation-state, domestic security, peace, and
order can be constitutionally obtained through the exercise of very
37 Joyner v. Browning, 30 F. Supp. 512, 519 (W.D. Tenn. 1939).3 8 See generally C. FAXRMAN, TH LAw oF MARxnAL R=ix 19-49 (2d ed.
1943); F. WEnnm, A PRAcEcAL. MANuAL oF MARTLAL LAw 6-15 (1940) [here-
inafter cited as PRacrrcAL MANuAL].39 Army Reg. No. 500-50 para. 10. Weiner defines martial law as "the
carrying on of government in domestic territory by military agencies, in whole or
in part, with the consequent supercession of some or all civil agencies." PRAc-rcAL
MANuAL 10 (emphasis added).
Weiner also wrote:
Martial law is the public law of necessity. Necessity calls it forth,
necessity justifies its exercise and necessity measures the extent and
degree to which it may be employed. That necessity is no formal, artificial,
legalistic concept but an actual and factual one: it is the necessity of tak-
ing action to safeguard the state against insurrection, riot, disorder or
public calamity.... PRAmrlcAL MANUAL 16.
Weiner modified his definition of martial law somewhat when he wrote:
By definition... martial law includes every form of military aid to the
civil power.
Martial law becomes relevant only when a particular situation can
no longer be controlled by the agencies of civil government without
military aid. .... Weiner, Martial Law Today, 55 A.B.AJ. 723, 724(1969) (emphasis added).
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extreme measures which would otherwise be unconstitutional. 40 And
in the area of actual combat, the courts have held that the will of the
commander governs, not the law.41 Even during the existence of
actual war, however, the military is constitutionally restrained from
exercising absolute discretionary power. For example, during war
and in the area of actual combat, the military can seize a citizen's
property if military necessity so dictates. However, the property
owner is entitled to full compensation for the property seized as pro-
vided by the fifth amendment of the Constitution;42 and before the
property can be seized by the military, there must be an urgent neces-
sity for the seizure that cannot be met by civil authorities.43
Protection of the citizen from the excesses of the military power
of the executive during war is no less than that afforded property
by the courts and the Constitution. In Ex parte Milligan,44 the Supreme
Court held that although the Civil War was still being fought, a
civilian living in a non-hostile, non-combat area of the country
could not be tried, sentenced, or imprisoned by military authorities.
This holding was reaffimed eighty years later when the Court invali-
dated the reign of martial law invoked in Hawaii during World
War 11.45 Quoting Milligan, the Supreme Court re-established the
doctrine that an absolute necessity must exist before martial law can
be invoked, even during war, by stating:
Martial law cannot arise from a threatened invasion. The necessity
must be actual and present; the invasion real, such as effectually
closes the courts and deposes the civil administration.
... If, in foreign invasion or civil war, the courts are actually
closed, and it is impossible to administer criminal justice according
to law, then, on the theatre of active military operations, where
war really prevails, there is a necessity to furnish a substitute for
the civil authority, thus overthrown, to preserve the safety of the
4 0 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (forced confinement of
citizens of Japanese descent to "relocation centers"); Hirabayashi v. United States,320 U.S. 81 (1943) (curfew applying only to citizens of Japanese descent).
41 Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158, 164-70 (1879); United States v. Diekelman,
92 U.S. 520, 526 (1875).
42 United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623, 628-29 (1871); Mitchell
v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 134 (1851).
43 [T]he danger must be immediate and impending; or the necessity
urgent for the public service, such as will not admit of delay, and
where the action of the civil authority would be too late in providing
the means which the occasion calls for. .... It is the emergency that
gives the right, and the emergency must be shown to exist before the
taking can be justified. Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115,
134 (1851).
4471 U.S. (4 Wall.)2 (1866).
45 Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
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army and society; and as no power is left but the military, it is
allowed to govern by martial rule until the laws can have their
free course. As necessity creates the rule, so it limits its duration;
for, if this government is continued after the courts are reinstated,
it is a gross usurpation of power. Martial rule can never exist where
the courts are open, and in the proper and unobstructed exercise
of their jurisdiction- . . (Emphasis added.) 46
The Court was stating no new principles, for the concepts had already
permeated our common law heritage.47 Only dire necessity, incapable
of being adequately handled by the civil authorities, justifies the use
of martial law and military force against American citizens-even in
time of actual war.
Thus, the prime area of concern is the proclamation of martial law
and the use of state military forces by state Governors in situations
not amounting to, or even remotely approaching, war or anything so
critical, namely rebellion, insurrection, riot, unlawful violence, and
lesser disorders such as campus demonstrations that may slightly
exceed the limits of constitutional protection. Generally, a state Gov-
ernor has the power to restore peace and order by the use of military
force if necessary.48 The question is, what are the limits on that power
when the situation is of this lesser degree of severity?
Recognizing a disutility in allowing subordinate officials and
military personnel to challenge the executive's determination of the
existence of a situation requiring the use of military force and his
order activating the militia, the courts initially held that the President's
determination that such a situation did exist must be conclusive of
that fact and unreviewable.49 This rule of conclusiveness was also
46Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866).
47 For martial law, which is built upon no settled principles, but is en-
tirely arbitrary in its decisions, is, as Sir Matthew Hale observes, in truth
and reality no law, but something indulged rather than allowed as a
law. The necessity of order and discipline in an army is the only thing
which can give it countenance; and therefore it ought not to be permitted
in time of peace, when the king's courts are open for all persons to
receive justice according to the laws of the land. 1 W. BLAcKsToNE,
CoMsmrAmrus 413.
48 See notes 22-27 supra, and accompanying text.49 Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862); Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 19 (1827). In the Prize Cases, supra, the Court held:
Whether the President in fulfilling his duties, as Commander in Chief, in
suppressing an insurrection, has met with such armed hostile resistance,
and a civil war of such alarming proportions as will compel him to accord
to them the character of belligerents, is a question to be decided by him,
and this Court must be governed by the decisions and acts of the
political department of the Government to which this power was en-
trusted. Prize Cases, supra at 670.
In Martin v. Mott, supra, the Court held:
If it be a limited power, the question arises, by whom is the exigency to
be judged of and decided?... We are all of opinion, that the authority
(Continued on next page)
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applied to the actions of state Governors calling out the state militia
to suppress what they determined to be disorders requiring military
action and a proclamation of martial law.50
When the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment became
applicable to the states, a constitutional basis was created upon which
the federal courts could review these previously unreviewable de-
terminations of state executives. Incredibly, in 1909 the Supreme
Court in Moyer v. Peabody1 revitalized the pre-fourteenth amend-
ment doctrine of conclusiveness of executive determinations of what
situations require military force and whether the militia should be
activated. In Moyer, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a union
leader's complaint charging that he had been arrested and detained
by state military forces for the duration of a labor dispute. The
Court held that the Governor was the final judge of the necessity for
declaring that a state of insurrection existed and of the propriety of
the actions taken to restore peace and order.52 In essence, the Court
implied that due process did not apply to a state governor exercising
his powers in the area of martial law. A governor's assertion that a
situation necessitating the use of military force existed, his proclama-
tion of martial law, and the actions ordered by him pursuant to such
proclamation were held to be completely within the discretion of the
Governor and unreviewable by any court-federal or state.53
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
to decide whether the exigency has arisen, belongs exclusively to the
president, and that his decision is conclusive upon all other persons.
Martin v. Mott, supra at 29-30.
5OLuther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). This case dealt with a
challenge to the imposition of martial law in Rhode Island. The Court held:[Ulnquestionably, a State may use its military power to put down an
armed insurrection, too strong to be controlled by the civil authority ....
The State itself must determine what degree of force the crisis demands.
And if the government of Rhode Island deemed the armed opposition so
formidable, and so ramified throughout the State, as to require the useof its military force and the declaration of martial law, we see no ground
upon which this court can question its authority .... Id. at 45.
51212 U.S. 78 (1909).52 It is admitted, as it must be, that the Governor's declaration that a
state of insurrection existed is conclusive of that fact. Moyer v. Peabody,
212 U.S. 78, 83 (1909).
So long as such arrests are made in good faith and in the honest
belief that they are needed in order to head the insurrection off, the
Governor is the final judge.
When it comes to a decision by the head of the State upon a matter
involving its life, the ordinary rights of individuals must yield to what he
deems the necessities of the moment. Id. at 85.
63 See Engdabl, Federal Constitutional Restraints on the Use and the Powers
of the National Guard in Civil Disturbance Situations 3-8, June 3, 1970 (pre-
liminary memorandum prepared by the Law Revision Center of the University
of Colorado School of Law); Weiner, Martial Law Today, 55 A.B.A.J. 723, 724(1969); 64 Micir. L. REv., supra note 22, at 300-01.
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The Moyer doctrine was not repudiated until the Court's decision
in Sterling v. Constantin54 in 1932. In that case, the Governor of Texas
declared that an insurrection beyond the control of local authorities
existed in certain counties due to wasteful oil production in violation
of state conservation laws, and proclaimed martial law. All oil wells
were shut down by military force and were later allowed to resume
operation in compliance with administrative regulations limiting pro-
duction. The federal district court enjoined the administrative orders,
and the Governor retaliated by taking military control of the wells.
The Court held that whether a situation existed that justified the Gov-
ernor's invasion of the rights of the well owners was not settled exclu-
sively by the Governor's actions and declarations, but was subject to
judicial review and determination. The action of the district court in
issuing the injunction was affirmed.55
The Court in Sterling limited the Moyer doctrine of executive con-
clusiveness 6 to situations where actual violence existed and where
the Governor's actions were directly related to quelling the violence.57
Where no violence existed, or where the Governor's acts were not
related to the alleviation of the disorder in question, the Governor's
proclamation of martial law was not only inconclusive, but was all but
void, for it could not justify any military action taken pursuant to it.
A real necessity that cannot be met by civil authorities and can only
be handled by the use of military force is absolutely essential before a
Governor's declaration of necessity and proclamation of martial law
can justify subsequent actions in light of the fourteenth amendment.6 8
54 287 U.S. 378 (1932).
55Id. at 398-403.
56 The opinion in Sterling v. Constantin is internally inconsistent. An over-
view suggests that the Court repudiated the Moyer doctrine altogether. See notes
59-62 infra, and accompanying text.
57By virtue of his duty to 'cause the laws to be faithfully executed,' the
Executive is appropriately vested with the discretion to determine whether
an exigency requiring military aid for that purpose has arisen. His
decision to that effect is conclusive .... The nature of the power also
necessarily implies that there is a permitted range of honest judgment as
to the measures to be taken in meeting force with force, in suppressing
violence and restoring order .... Such measures, conceived in good faith,
in the face of the emergency and directly related to the quelling of the
disorder or the prevention of its continuance, fall within the discretion
of the Executive in the exercise of his authority to maintain peace.
... Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 399-401 (1932).
See PnAarcAL MA uAL, supra note 38, at 21-22; Weiner, supra note 39, at 724.
58 ... [Aippellants assert ... that the Governor's order had the quality of
a supreme and unchallengeable edict, overriding al conflicting rights of
property and unreviewable through the Judicial power of the Federal
Government.
If this extreme position could be deemed to be well taken, it is
manifest that the fiat of a state Governor, and not the Constitution of the
(Continued on next page)
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Although Sterling clearly obliterates the Moyer doctrine that a
governor's determination of the necessity of declaring martial law and
his implementation of it are conclusive, 59 the opinion is internally
inconsistent. On the one hand, the Court asserts that the executive's
determination that military force is necessary is conclusive60 while
on the other it emphasizes the inconclusiveness of such determina-
tions.61 The conflict can be resolved only by looking at what the Court
did in the case. That examination will reveal that the Court refused to
accept the Governor's declaration of insurrection and proclamation of
martial law as conclusive and held the actions done pursuant to them
to be illegal. Thus, the limited deference paid to gubernatorial con-
clusiveness must be regarded as dicta and lip service to a dead
doctrine. 2
Unfortunately, the poison of Moyer seemed to outlive the applica-
tion of the antidote in Sterling. State governors, thwarted by law from
achieving desired goals, continued to use proclamations of martial law
and military force to attain illegal ends where it was clearly not per-
missable to do so consistent with due process. However, Sterling had
given the courts a weapon with which to combat executive lawlessness
and despotism, and the courts used it.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
United States, would be the supreme law of the land; that the restrictions
of the Federal Constitution upon the exercise of state power would be
but impotent phrases, the futility of which the State may at any time
disclose by the simple process of transferring powers of legislation to the
Governor to be exercised by him, beyond control, upon his assertion of
necessity. Under our system of government such a conclusion is obvi-
ously untenable. There is no such avenue o escape from the paramount
authority of the Federal Constitution. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S.
378, 397-98 (1932).
... Thus, in the theatre of actual war, there are occasions in which
private property may be taken or destroyed. . . . 'But . . . in all of
these cases the danger must be immediate and impending; or the
necessity urgent for the public service, such as will not admit of delay,
and where the action of the civil authority would be too late in providing
the means which the occasion calls for .... Every case must depend on
its own circumstances. It is the emergency that gives the right, and the
emergency must be shown to exist before the taking can be justified.
S. .' There is no ground for the conclusion that military orders in the case
of insurrection have any higher sanction or confer any greater immunity.
Id. at 401.
59 It does not follow... that every sort of action the Governor may take,
no matter how unjustified by the exigency or subversive of private right
and the jurisdiction of the courts, otherwise available, is conclusively
supported by mere executive fiat. The contrary is well established. What
are allowable limits of military discretion, and whether or not they have
been overstepped in a particular case, are judicial questions. Id. at 400-01.
60 See note 57 supra.
61 See notes 58-59 supra.
62 See PnarncAL MAuAL, supra note 38 at 23-25; Weiner, supra note 39 at
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Perhaps inspired by the facts in Sterling, the Governor of Oklahoma
declared martial law and used state military forces to seize oil wells
in order to enforce state laws prohibiting waste. The owner of the
wells had not been found guilty of breaking the law in question by
any administrative or judicial tribunal. The Governor was enjoined.63
Two years later, the same Governor attempted to force Oklahoma City
into adopting a segregation ordinance by proclaiming martial law in
certain parts of the city and declaring a "segregation zone" for whites
and another for blacks with a "nontrespass zone' between the two.
The Governor ordered that martial law and his segregation decree
continue until the city adopted an ordinance to the effect of the edict.
The court held the decree void and the resulting ordinance uncon-
stitutional. 64 Another Oklahoma Governor, undaunted by the failures
of his predecessors, proclaimed martial law and sent armed state
troops to stop construction of a dam being built largely by the federal
government. The Governor's purpose was to exact money damages
for flooded roads in excess of that allowed by statute. At no time was
there any insurrection, riot, tumult or violence against civil authority,
nor was there any failure of the civil authority to function. The court
enjoined the Governor,65 and the Oklahoma executive went down for
the third time.
Unable to legally fulfill a campaign promise to remove the State's
highway commissioner, the Governor of South Carolina declared the
highway department to be in a state of insurrection and rebellion!
Under his declaration of martial law, armed troops seized the offices,
operations, and assets of the department and forcibly removed the
lawful commissioner. The area was peaceful and the courts were
open at the time.6 6 The Governor of Georgia used the same tactic to
remove the chairman of the State's highway board whose right to the
position had been repeatedly adjudicated by the courts.67 Both Gov-
ernors were enioined.
In Tennessee, the Governor, in order to enhance his renomination
prospects, threatened the use of military force and the imposition of a
military dictatorship for the sole purpose of preventing thousands of
legally registered voters from voting. The court, unimpressed with the
Governor's arguments asserting the conclusiveness of his determination
of necessity, enjoined him.68 The Governor of Iowa declared an
63 Russell Petroleum Co. v. Walker 162 Okla. 216, 19 P.2d 582 (1933).
64 Allen v. Oklahoma. City, 175 Okfa. 421, 52 P.2d 1054 (1935).
05 United States v. Phillips, 33 F. Supp. 261 (N.D. Okda. 1940)6 6 Hearon v. Calus, 178 S.C. 381, 183 S.E. 13 (1935).6 7Miller v. Rivers, 31 F. Supp. 540 (M.D. Ga. 1940).
68 Joyner v, Browning, 30 F. Supp. 512 (W.D. Tenn. 1939).
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emergency and proclaimed martial law to prevent a hearing by the
N.L.R.B.69 In Arkansas, the Governor used state troops to thwart a
federal court order to integrate a high school. It was shown that no
violence had occurred or would occur if the court order were carried
out. The Governor was enjoined.70
The Governor of Minnesota, upon the request of local authorities,
proclaimed martial law and sent state military forces to control a
violent labor dispute involving plaintiff's factory. Instead of restraining
those committing the violence against the factory and its workers,
the Governor thought it expedient to use the troops to close the plant,
thus pacifying the strikers and returning order to the situation. He
was enjoined. 7- Twenty-three years later, another Minnesota Governor
reacted the same way to a violent strike, except that this time the local
authorities had not requested martial law. The local government was
functioning, and the civil authorities could have handled the situation
without martial law. He, too, was enjoined.72
This brief survey of illegal use of martial law by governors is not to
suggest that the courts struck down all actions of the state executives
in this area. For example, in Minnesota, when a strike became violent
and civil authorities attempted to restore order but were unable to do
so and requested military assistance, the Governor's proclamation of
martial law and his sending of the state military forces were upheld
by the courts.73 Likewise, in Indiana, when local authorities lost con-
trol of a violent general strike and petitioned the Governor for military
forces, the Governor's proclamation of martial law and actions pur-
suant to it were sustained.74
An analysis of the cases dealing with the emergency military powers
of state governors and a synthesis of their holdings suggest a doctrine,
conformity to which is necessary if due process requirements are to be
even nominally satisfied. The doctrine is: Before a state governor can,
within the requirements of due process, declare that a situation re-
quiring military force exists, proclaim or continue a state of martial law,
call upon or direct state military forces, or take or continue other
actions pursuant to a proclamation of martial law 1) there must in fact
exist a dire necessity consisting of actual unlawful violence or disorder
69 N.L.R.B., Press Release No. 1118, Aug. 2, 1938.7 0 Faubiis v. United States, 254 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1958).7 1 Strutwear Knitting Co. v. Olson, 13 F. Supp. 384 (D. Minn. 1936).
72 Wilson & Co. v. Freeman, 179 F. Supp. 520 (D. Minn. 1959).
73 Powers Mercantile Co. v. Olson, 7 F. Supy. 865 (D. Minn. 1934).7 4 Cox v. McNutt, 12 F. Supp. 355 (S.D. Ind. 1935). See State ex rel. Roberts
v. Swope, 38 N.M. 53, 28 P.2d 4 (1934).
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or a clear, real threat of imminent unlawful violence or disorder;75
2) local government must have disintegrated,76 or civil authorities
must be unable or unwilling to cope with the situation; 77 3) any actions
75 See Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 397-398, 401 (1932); Wilson &
Co. v. Freeman, 179 F. Supp. 520, 525-26 (D. Minn. 1959); United States v.
Phillips, 33 F. Supp. 261, 269 (N.D. Okla. 1940); Joyner v. Browning, 30 F. Supp.
512, 518-19 (W.D. Tenn. 1939); Cox v. McNutt, 12 F. Supp. 355, 360 (S.D.
Ind. 1935); Powers Mercantile Co. v. Olson 7 F. Supp. 865, 868 (D. Minn. 1934);
Constantin v. Smith, 57 F.2d 227, 240-41 (E.D. Tex. 1932); State ex rel. Roberts
v. Swope, 38 N.M. 53, -, 28 P.2d 4, 6 (1934); Hearon v. Calus, 178 S.C. 381, -,
183 S.E. 13, 21, 24 (1935); Ex parte Lavinder, 88 W. Va. 713, -, 108 S.E. 428,
429 (1921).
For the Court's opinion in Sterling v. Constantin, supra, see note 58 supra.
For a discussion of Wion & Co. v. Freeman, supra, see text accompanying notes
82-83, infra.
In United States v. Phillips, supra, the court held that:
A Governor's proclamation of martial law does not legalize his use of
military force where, in fact... there is no violence or disorder or resis-
tance to civil authority. Id. at 269.
Following an examination of the relevant cases in the area of martial law,
the court in Constantin v. Smith, supra, stated that
[Olne general principle runs through them . . . that dire necessity
and dire necessity alone, the necessity of self-defense, suspends ordinary
constitutional guaranties, and that, where that necessity does not in fact
exist, no such suspension occurs. Id. at 240.
In Ex arte Lavinder, supra, the court held, with regard to when martial lawwas justified, that:
Its sole justification is the failure of the civil law fully to operate and
function, for the time being, by reason of the paralysis or overthrow of
its agencies, in consequence of an insurrection, invasion, or other enter-
prise hostile to the state, and resulting in actual warfare. Id. at -, 108
S.E. at 429.76 See Wilson & Co. v. Freeman, 179 F. Supp. 520, 525, 528 (D. Minn. 1959);
Constantin v. Smith, 57 F.2d 227, 240-41 (E.D. Tex. 1932); Ex parte Lavinder, 88
W. Va. 713, -, 108 S.E. 428, 429 (1921); Op. Ky. Air'y GE N. 38949 (1956).
Wilson & Co. v. Freeman, supra, is discussed in the text accompanying notes
82-83, infra. The relevant quotation from Ex parte Lavinder, supra, is set out in
note 75 supra. In Op. Ky. ATr'y GEN. 38949 (1956), the Kentucky Attorney Gen-
eral wrote:
We conclude that true martial law could not be proclaimed in Kentucky
in time of peace, or even in time of war, unless by invasion or otherwise,
the civil authorities bad been overthrown .... Id.
77 See Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 401 (1932); Wilson & Co. v.
Freeman, 179 F. Supp. 520, 525-27 (D. Minn. 1959); Powers Mercantile Co. v.
Olson, 7 F. Supp. 865, 868 (D. Minn. 1934); Constantin v. Smith, 57 F.2d 227,
240-41 (E.D. Tex. 1932); Franks v. Smith, 142 Ky. 232, -, 134 S.W. 484, 487-88
(1911); State ex rel. Roberts v. Swope, 38 N.M. 53, -, 28 P.2d 4, 7 (1934);
Hearon v. Calus, 178 S.C. 381, -, 183 S.E. 13, 21, 24 (1935); Ex parte Lavinder,
88 W. Va. 713, -, 108 S.E. 428, 429 (1921); Op. Ky. ATry GEN. 38949 (1956).
In Franks v. Smith, supra, the Governor of Kentucky called out the State
Militia to stop vigilante activity in a county. While the court held that the
Governor was the sole judge of the necessity that required the aid of state military
forces, the holding was qualified:
The presumption of course is that he will not exercise this high power
unless it becomes necessary to maintain peace and quiet and protect the
life or property of the citizen, after the local civil authorities have
shown themselves unable to cope with or control the situation. Id. at -,
134 S.W. at 487.
(Continued on next page)
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taken by military forces pursuant to a proclamation of martial law
must be directly related to the quelling of the unlawful violence or
disorder, prevention of its continuance, or prevention of its imminent
occurrence;7 8 4) the military forces must exercise the minimum force
or deprivation of rights necessary to restore peace and order and
cannot utilize means not legally available to civil authorities under
the circumstances; 79 and 5) no action, declaration, proclamation, or
any other exercise of executive emergency military authority is to be
conclusive or unreviewable by the courts.80
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
This doctrine was reaffirmed in Op. Ky. ATr'Y GEN. 38949 (1956). In State ex rel.
Roberts v. Swope, supra, the court held that:
The employment of the military is not resorted to while the local peace
officers are able to cope with the situation. Id. at -, 28 P.2d at 7.
For the Court's holding in Sterling v. Constantin, supra, see note 58 supra. For a
discussion of Wilson & Co. v. Freeman, supra, see notes 82-83 infra, and accom-
panying text. For holding in Ex parte Lavinder, supra, see note 75 .supra.
78 See Sterling v. Constantin 287 U.S. 378, 399-400 (1932); Faubus v.
United States, 254 F.2d 797, 807 (8th Cir. 1958); Wilson & Co. v. Freeman, 179
F. Supp. 520 (D. Minn. 1959); Strutwear Knitting Co. v. Olson, 13 F. Supp. 384,
391 (D. Minn. 1936); Cox v. McNutt, 12 F. Supp. 355, 359 (S.D. Ind. 1935);
Powers Mercantile Co. v. Olson, 7 F. Supp. 865, 868 (D. Minn. 1934); State ex rel.
Roberts v. Swope, 38 N.M. 53, -, 28 P.2d 4, 6 (1934); Hearon v. Calus, 178 S.C.
381, -, 183 S.E. 13, 21 (1935).
For the Court's holding in Sterling v. Constantin, supra, see note 57 supra.
For a discussion of Wilson & Co. v. Freeman, supra, see text accompanying notes
82-83 infra.
The court in Strutwear Knitting Co. v. Olson, supra, held that
[Tlhe measures which he [the Governor] may adopt, if conceived in good
faith in the face of emergency and 'directly related to the quelling of
the disorder or the prevention of its continuance, fall within the discretion
of the executive in the exercise of his authority to maintain peace.!
Id. at 391.
In Powers Mercantile Co. v. Olson, supra, the court held that
Arbitrary and capricious acts of the Governor, and those having no rela-
tion to the necessities of the situation may be enjoined by the courts....
Id. at 868.
79 See, e.g., Franks v. Smith, 142 Ky. 232, -, 134 S.W. 484, 489-93 (1911);
Op. Ky. ATT'y GEN. 38949 (1956).
80 See Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 397-98 400-01 (1932); Faubus v.
United States, 254 F.2d 797, 806 (8th Cir. 1958); Wilson & Co. v. Freeman, 179
F. Supp. 520, 526-28 (D. Minn. 1959); United States v. Phillips, 33 F. Supp. 261,
269 (N.D. Okla. 1940); Joyner v. Browning, 30 F. Supp. 512, 518 (W.D. Tenn.
1939); Powers Mercantile Co. v. Olson, 7 F. Supp. 865, 868 (D. Minn. 1934); State
ex rel. Roberts v. Swope, 38 N.M. 53, -, 28 P.2d 4, 6 (1934); Russell Petroleum
Co. v. Walker, 162 Okla. 216, -, 19 P.2d 582, 588 (1933); Hearon v. Calus, 178
S.C. 381, -, 183 S.E. 13, 20, 22 (1935).
For the Court's holding in Sterling v. Constantin, supra, see notes 58-59 supra.
For a discussion of Wilson & Co. v. Freeman, supra, see notes 82-83 infta, and
accompanying text.
In Powers Mercantile Co. v. Olson, supra, the court said:[W]e may inquire whether there was any justification for the governor's
act in requiring the military authorities to take charge. . . and whether
the means which he has employed have any relation to the duties
imposed upon him .... Id. at 868.
The court in United States v. Phillips, supra, concurred by holding that "[tihe
Governor's action in using military force... is subject to judicial review." Id at 269.
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It appears from this analysis that the clear and present danger test
is at most only a part of the more complex doctrine required by due
process of law and imposed upon the states by the fourteenth amend-
ment of the Constitution. No viable support exists for the assertion
that martial law with its inherent deprivations of liberty can be pro-
claimed and enforced solely because of the existence of a clear and
present danger. The application of such a simplistic test beckons us
back to the dubious doctrine of Moyer v. Peabody8l and opens wide
the door to gubernatorial abuse of discretion and judicially sanctioned
annihilation of due process through the vehicle of unreviewable
executive fiat. A clear and present danger per se cannot justify
executive proclamations of martial law and exercise of military force.
The case of Wilson & Company v. Freeman8 2 provides a synthesis
of those elements comprising the suggested doctrine as evolved by
the courts since Sterling v. Constantin. In Wilson, union employees of
plaintiff's factory went on strike and violently tried to prevent strike-
breakers from working in the plant. Local government was func-
tioning and no showing was made that local law enforcement agencies
could not handle the situation with perhaps the aid of military forces.
However, the Governor declared martial law and ordered troops to
shut down plaintiffs plant in order to halt the violence. In granting
the injunction restraining the Governor from interfering with the
factory operations, the court was unequivocal in its holding:
[W]hen there is actual war in a community, or where insur-
rection or revolt occurs so that the duly constituted government is
usurped and overcome by the insurrectionists or mobs, the Gov-
ernor is impliedly authorized to declare martial law. But where
any disturbance . . . presents a situation with which the local
police or other law enforcement agencies are not able to cope,
it does not follow that, without more, the drastic and oppressive
rule of martial law can be imposed upon any community.... In
fact, the basis for martial law assumes that local government has
completely broken down and is, or is about to be taken over by the
forces of a mob .... [A] serious situation existed .... Obviously,
however, plaintiff was within its rights . .. in attempting to keep
its plant in production.. . . Plaintiff cannot be held responsible
for mob violence ... precipitated by its attempt to keep its plant
open....
At the time the Governor declared martial law, the local gov-
ernment ... was functioning. The courts were open, the citizens
were moving freely... without danger, except those who desired
to ... work for plaintiff. The District Court . . . had issued re-
straining orders against mass picketing and violence, and contempt
81 See notes 51-53 supra, and accompanying text.
82 179 F. Supp. 520 (D. Minn. 1959).
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citations . . . had been set for hearing... but... the Governor
summarily declared martial law.. . . The rights of the courts to
proceed . . . were enjoined. The workers . . . were forbidden to
return, and plaintiff's right ... to operate its plant was abrogated
by the decree of the military.
We are not unmindful of the discretion which must necessarily
rest in the Governor of a State in determining whether martial
law.., shall be imposed.... But a free people do not surrender
to mob rule by the expediency of martial law until all means
available ... to enforce the laws have proved futile. The imposi-
tion of the drastic action and the curtailment of constitutional rights
of citizens of a state resulting from a declaration of martial law,
cannot be sustained except in situations of dire necessity....
The Governor possesses no absolute authority to declare
martial law. Military rule cannot be imposed upon a community
simply because it may seem to be more expedient than to enforce
the law by using the National Guard to aid the local civil authori-
ties ....
... A declaration of martial law connotes the disintegration of
the local and State Government which has been created to maintain
peace and order under civil rule .... 83
The Court in AAUP v. Nunn found that a clear and present danger
existed and held that this fact per se was sufficient justification for
the Governor's actions placing the University of Kentucky under
martial law, suspending constitutional liberties, and sending armed
military forces to the campus to enforce his edicts. An application
of the doctrine suggested by both forty years of precedent and the
better reasoning requires a contrary conclusion.
There existed no dire necessity, no violence, no disorder. The
building had been burned almost twenty-four hours prior to the
Governor's proclamation of martial law. The interim period between
the fire and the proclamation had been peaceful and normal. Despite
the university President's declaration of limited emergency, no emer-
gency seems to have existed-limited or otherwise. The University
was open. All university buildings and offices were open. Students
attended classes. Final examinations were given. The President of
the University himself addressed a large gathering of students without
incident. No violence occurred. No demonstrations were held, except
the single one late in the afternoon challenging the President's curfew,
and that demonstration was peaceful. The situation was drastically
less acute than that presented to the court in Wilson. In that case
there was actual violence in progress when the Governor proclaimed
martial law. In AAUP v. Nunn there was no violence and no dire
8 Id. at 525-28.
[Vol. 59
COMENS
necessity requiring the use of state military forces and the curtailment
of constitutional rights.
Local government was functioning normally and local law enforce-
ment agencies had the situation under complete control up until the
time they were superseded by the military. At no time had the demon-
strations escalated to a point beyond the control of the local security
forces. Nothing seems to have happened on the day that the Governor
proclaimed martial law or the previous day when the building was
burned that was not within the capacity of campus police with perhaps
support from the city police forces. When limited violence did break
out on the afternoon of May 5, 1970, campus police controlled the
situation. When students gathered in front of the Army R.O.T.C.
building on the night of the fire, campus and city police controlled the
situation. Even after the proclamation of martial law on May 6, 1970,
it was the police forces that cleared the students from the campus
before the National Guard troops arrived, clearly showing their
capability to handle the situation. Also, the local courts were open
and functioning, thus they were available to provide any orders that
were necessary and justifiable. The Governor had an entire day to
seek such relief in the courts, but chose to rely instead on the arbitrary
power of martial law even when the civil authority was intact and in
control.
In Wilson the court was faced with a simliar situation. The courts
were open and functioning. Injunctions had been issued, and those
violating the orders of the court were set to be punished not by the
harsh, overbroad rule of martial law which abridges the rights of all
citizens, but by the surgical precision of the civil law of contempt
working through due process. Both Governors ignored the processes
of justice established by the civil law and relied instead on the
expedience of martial law which did not seem to require rational
motives, equity, or respect for basic constitutional freedoms. It was
immensely less difficult to resort to the dictatorial rule of military force
rather than to justify before a court of equity why constitutional rights
had to be suspended on the university campus and why two hundred
fifty soldiers armed with deadly weapons and bayonets had to be
sent into the midst of peaceful demonstrators exercising the rights of
a system they had been admonished to accept and follow. The court
in Wilson severely criticized the Governor of Minnesota for bypassing
the court system. The Court in AAUP P. Nunn constructively condoned
such behavior on the part of the Governor of Kentucky.
The Governor's proclamation of martial law, suspension of con-
stitutional rights of speech and assembly, and imposition of military
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rule by armed troops on campus were not directly related to the
alleviation of the alleged harms justifying their existence. As in the
Wilson case, the Kentucky Governor indirectly applied military force
against what he perceived to be (in good faith or not) a clear and
present danger. This resulted in an abridgement of the constitutional
rights of those guilty of no wrong, while sanctions directly related to
the "harms" would have led to the same result without curtailing
rights. For example, in Wilson the Governor of Minnesota was faced
with a mob of strikers who were illegally using violence to force
plaintiff to stop operating his plant. The Governor had two options.
He could restrain the mob from continuing their illegal conduct, a
direct action. He could also force plaintiff to close his plant which
would pacify the mob, since this was the goal of their violence. This
would be an indirect action. Both would result in the same thing-
cessation of the violence. However, the indirect method would abridge
plaintiff's rights while the direct would not. The Governor chose the
indirect method of closing plaintiff's plant and was promptly enjoined.
This is similar to the situation that faced the Court in AAUP v. Nunn.
The Governor was allegedly concerned with possible arson, outside
agitators, bomb threats, and disruption of the academic process. These
harms were attacked by prohibiting free speech and assembly and
enforcing curfews. The simplistic logic involved was sound: an arsonist
cannot set fire to a building if nobody is allowed on campus; outside
agitators cannot agitate if speech and assembly are prohibited to all
persons; bombs cannot be set if all people are barred from the campus;
the academic process is not disrupted if people cannot gather and
talk even peacefully.
Arson could have been prevented by securing campus buildings
and patrolling them, instead of banning the exercise of free speech and
assembly. There can be no significant causal relation between free
speech and assembly on the one hand and arson and bombings on the
other that would necessitate the former's annihilation in order to
prevent the latter. Persons prone to violence or incitement could
have been kept under surveillance, instead of excluding all persons
from campus. If identification of non-university persons was a legal
concern of the authorities, it could have been accomplished by I.D.
checks without abridging the rights of the students across the board
as the Governor's order did. Purchasing academic tranquility by
forbidding students and faculty from assembling and discussing public
issues in an orderly manner, by ending examinations, stopping use of
the libraries, keeping faculty members from their offices, and turning
the campus into an armed camp stretches even the politician's ability
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to rationalize. Here, as in Wilson, the Governor chose the more
expedient and politically popular tactic of suppressing free speech
and assembly in order to avert alleged clear and present dangers
when more direct methods would have achieved the same ends and
preserved constitutional liberties at the University of Kentucky. The
latter course, perhaps, would have been more inconvenient, but incon-
venience is the smallest price that government must pay if it is to
enjoy the support of free men and women.
By proclaiming martial law and suspending constitutional liberties
without the existence of a dire necessity and when all contingencies
had been and could have been controlled by local police authorities
acting in direct relation to the necessity, the Governor utilized greater
force than was necessary to control the situation.
In sustaining defendants' motion to dismiss and by justifying the
Governor's actions solely on the basis of the clear and present danger
test, the Court in AAUP v. Nunn essentially refused to review the
Governor's proclamation of martial law and his use of state military
forces. Even if the existence of a dire necessity were granted, the
court should have inquired into the ability of the local authorities to
control the situation; into the reason why injunctive relief was not
sought prior to the proclamation, since there was sufficient time to seek
such relief; and into the relationship between the Governor's orders
and the necessity he was allegedly attempting to meet.
The clear trend of the courts would necessitate a finding that the
Governor's actions were unconstitutional. The injunction should have
issued.
II.
It has been established that clear and present danger per se is not a
proper test of the constitutionality of a governor's proclamation of
martial law and use of state military forces pursuant to that proclama-
tion. A new doctrine is suggested that synthesizes the holdings and
trends of the courts. It is argued that compliance with this doctrine
is essential if the Governor's actions in exercising his emergency
military powers are to be consistent with due process of law. This
appears to be the state of the law today. However, it may be that the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment will tolerate no test
at all when a governor dispatches military forces to control campus
demonstrations. It is suggested that the fourteenth amendment may
forbid the use of National Guard troops in any capacity on college
and university campuses to control demonstrations.
It must be remembered that the typical campus disorder is of
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much less severity than an armed rebellion or insurrection. Yet military
forces armed and supposedly trained for rebellion, insurrection, and
even all-out war are used by state governors almost routinely in such
campus demonstration situations." Of such practices, the President's
Commission on Campus Unrest concluded in its report that:
[S]ending civil authorities [referring to National Guard troops] onto
a college campus armed as if for war-armed only to kill-has
brought tragedy in the past. If this practice is not changed,
tragedy will come again.8 5
The shocking performance of the National Guard at Kent State
University 6 raises the question of whether there are constitutional
restraints on which agency a state may use to execute and enforce its
laws as long as the methods and procedures used comply with due
process requirements. There may very well be such restraints.
Evidence and data now emerging strongly suggest that the state militias
are so inherently incapable of performing consistently with due process
in a campus demonstration situation that the Constitution prohibits
their use. Three areas of concern have thus far emerged: 1) the
National Guard's political and emotional bias against student demon-
strators; 2) their inadequate training and lack of standards as to when
weapons may be used; and 3) the incitement resulting from their
very presence. No attempt will be made here to discuss these issues
in any depth. That task is perhaps better suited for the social scientists.
The purpose here is simply to raise these issues for future study and
consideration.
There are 850,000 National Guardsmen in the United States. The
vast majority of these men are blue-collar workers who tend to be
political conservatives hostile toward student dissent.87 An example
of this hatred, and what it can mean when held by those entrusted
to restore order, is evidenced by the fact that some of the Guardsmen
at Kent State University refused to obey the orders of their com-
manders to cease firing and had to be physically restrained from
continuing to fire their weapons at the students.88 The troops at Kent
State University had non-automatic M-1 rifles. National Guardsmen
are now being issued M-16 rifles-a machine gun type weapon.
Concerning the training received by National Guard troops, the
President's Commission on Campus Unrest said that "[tihe events at
84 See notes 5, 8, & 18 supra, and accompanying text.
85 Nwsw=, Oct. 5, 1970, at 25; N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1970, at 66, col. 3.8GSee notes 5-6 supra.
87 See Nx.wsw=x May 18, 1970, at 33F.88 See note 6 supra.
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Kent State betrayed.., the poor morale-indeed, the anxiety-that in-
evitable [sic] accompanies poor preparation." 9 Ever since poorly trained
National Guardsmen unnecessarily killed scores of people-many of
them innocent bystanders-in the urban riots of 1967, all guardsmen
have had to undergo a basic thirty-three hour riot control course which
is supplemented each year by a sixteen hour refresher course. Training
standards are developed by the Pentagon and center around the "rules
of engagement" which stress discipline and restraint in disorder situa-
tions. However, when the National Guard is in the service of the state,
they are not bound by the federal standards. The state rules of engage-
ment then apply, and they tend to be much less stringent as to when a
soldier may fire his weapon and for what purpose.90 The need to
examine the adequacy of National Guard training and the state rules
of engagement in light of due process was vividly demonstrated at
Kent State when one guardsman took it upon himself to fire at a
student who had made an obscene gesture.91
Lastly, the very presence of National Guard troops on a campus
during a demonstration is an inflammatory element in the disorder.
One commentator wrote that
Civil disorders by their very nature are highly charged emotional
situations, and the presence of a formidable armed and uniformed
military force does not, ipso facto, calm an already aroused civilian
population. At best, it may simply fan the fires of resentment;
at worst, it may trigger the troops, under the stress of necessity,
to take action which could ultimately result in their use of
"combat" tactics against fellow citizens.92
Thus, the sending of National Guard troops to a college campus
because there might be violence may inherently be a self-fulfilling
prophecy.
These areas of concern should be investigated and considered by
the courts whenever faced with a case such as AAUP v. Nunn, for
they suggest very strongly that the use of National Guard troops to
control campus disorders may be a denial of due process per se.
CONCLUSION
The Governor of Kentucky violated the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment when he proclaimed martial law and ordered
89NEwswxEE; Oct. 5, 1970, at 25.90 See NEwsw=, May 18, 1970, at 33F.
91 See NEwsvmK, Aug. 3, 1970, at 14.92 Mutter, Some Observations on Military Involvement in Domestic Disorders,
1969 Fim. B.J. 59.
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armed National Guard troops to the campus of the University of Ken-
tucky to suppress demonstrations and the exercise of the first amend-
ment rights of free speech and assembly. But this was not the real
tragedy of such abuse of executive military power. The real tragedy,
which will endure long after the incident of May, 1970 has faded from
the memory of all who experienced it, was and is that a court of law
validated this unconstitutional conduct by ignoring its duty to society
and bowing impotently to an executive assertion of necessity. As Mr
Justice Jackson wrote:
A military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer
than the military emergency. . . . But once a judicial opinion
rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the Constitu-
tion, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Con-
stitution sanctions such an order . . . the principle [t]hen lies
about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority
that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.
Every repetition imbeds that principle more deeply in our law and
thinldng and expands it to new purposes.. . . A military com-
mander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality and it is an
incident. But if we review and approve, that passing incident be-
comes the doctrine of the Constitution. There it has a generative
power of its own, and all that it creates will be in its own image....
I should hold that a civil court cannot be made to enforce an
order which violates constitutional limitations even if it is a reason-
able exercise of military authority. The courts can exercise only the
judicial power, can apply only law, and must abide by the Con-
stitution, or they cease to be civil courts and become instruments
of military policy.93
Surely this is the age of Leviathan come alive, an age in which the
behemoth of institutionalized repression of dissent lurks about our
door. The Court in AAUP v. Nunn has beckoned it enter.
Scott T. Wendelsdorf
93 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246-47 (1944) (dissenting
opinion).
